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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AS THE REVOLVING DOOR TURNS: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
ENTERING OR RETURNING TO PRIVATE PRACTICE AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*
ABSTRACT
Government lawyers regularly leave public service for private law
practice—often through the same revolving door that launched their public
careers. The law firms they join or to which they return welcome them because
of the experience they gained, and the expertise they developed, while in the
government. The challenge for former government lawyers and their law firms
is recognizing and managing conflicts of interest that sometimes arise out of
lawyers’ government service. To address the special conflict of interest concerns
that emerge from the revolving door of government service, the ABA formulated
Model Rule 1.11. With a single exception, Model Rule 1.11 displaces other ethics
rules that generally govern conflicts of interest in lawyers’ successive
representations. In so doing, Model Rule 1.11 attempts to balance the competing
interests in play when a matter spans a lawyer’s government service and private
practice.
Most conflict of interest controversies involving former government lawyers
pivot on the scope of the matter that is alleged to be the source of the conflict,
and the degree of the lawyer’s participation in the matter. To a lesser but
nonetheless critical extent, former government lawyers’ alleged acquisition of
confidential government information also spawns disputes. Whether former
government lawyers should be disciplined or disqualified for conflicts of interest
tied to their public service always requires case-specific inquiry. Avoiding
discipline and disqualification, and further avoiding imputed disqualification of
the lawyer’s law firm, requires former government lawyers and their law firms
to understand and to be able to navigate the uniqueness of Model Rule 1.11. This
article provides a practical guide for doing so.

* Managing Director, Professional Services, Aon Commercial Risk Solutions, Kansas City, Mo.
J.D., University of Kansas. Opinions expressed here are the author’s alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Government lawyers regularly leave public service for private
employment. 1 They may consider entering or returning to the private practice of
law because of the higher compensation law firms typically offer, or because
their time in government service has run its course. Perhaps their public careers
have reached plateaus, or they simply desire new professional challenges.
Regardless of their individual situations, these lawyers may have developed
significant expertise and specialized knowledge while in government service
that they anticipate capitalizing on by attracting, and ultimately representing,
clients in private practice.
On the other side of the coin, law firms commonly value Assistant U.S.
Attorneys, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission lawyers, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission lawyers, and state prosecutors when building
white collar crime and government enforcement and investigations practices.
Firms with cybersecurity and privacy practices may hope to lure legal talent
from any number of federal agencies, as well as the military. Firms with
education and higher education law practices may hope to hire lawyers from the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. Drawing from the
alphabet soup of federal agencies, law firms with employment and labor law
practices may plot strategy to attract senior OSHA, MSHA, and NLRB lawyers;
firms with environmental law practices may want to recruit select EPA lawyers;
firms that practice antitrust and competition law may look favorably at hiring
FTC lawyers; while firms with tax practices may value certain IRS lawyers.2
The list of federal and state government agencies and branches that employ
capable lawyers with expertise in a wide range of substantive areas and private
employment potential goes on.
Government lawyers moving into private practice and the law firms they
join share a common concern: conflicts of interest. 3 Although conflicts of

1. See generally Michael Ellenhorn, What Firms Should Ask Before Hiring Lawyers from
Gov’t, LAW360 (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.law360.com/legalethics [https://perma.cc/LC49A9KR] (“Every day seems to bring more stories of government lawyers leaving their posts for the
private sector.”); GREGORY C. SISK ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 421 (2018) (noting that many lawyers spend some time in public service
and that some rotate back and forth between private practice and government service).
2. OSHA is the acronym for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which is
part of the U.S. Department of Labor. MSHA is the acronym for the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, also part of the Department of Labor. NLRB is the acronym for the National Labor
Relations Board. EPA is the well-known acronym for the Environmental Protection Agency. FTC
is the acronym for the Federal Trade Commission. IRS is, of course, the acronym for the Internal
Revenue Service.
3. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Conflicts of Interest in
Environmental Law, 68 KAN. L. REV. 69, 69 (2019) (reporting that law firm general counsels rate
conflicts of interest as a major risk management concern); David D. Dodge, Moving Between
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interest challenge all lawyers regardless of their backgrounds, 4 government
lawyers moving into private practice are subject to special conflict of interest
rules. Under Rule 1.11(a)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a
lawyer who formerly served as a public officer or employee cannot “represent a
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee,” absent the appropriate
government agency’s informed consent. 5 If a former government lawyer is
disqualified from a representation under Model Rule 1.11(a)(2), then the
lawyer’s law firm is disqualified by imputation unless it implements screening,
fee apportionment, and client notification measures as specified in Model Rule
1.11(b). 6 Finally, for now, a former government lawyer who possesses
information that he or she knows to be “confidential government information
about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may
not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a
matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of
that person” unless otherwise expressly permitted. 7 “Confidential government
information” as used in Model Rule 1.11(c) describes “information that has been
obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time [Model Rule
1.11(c)] is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the
public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise
available to the public.” 8 If a former government lawyer is disqualified under
Model Rule 1.11(c), the lawyer’s firm will likewise be disqualified by
imputation unless it timely screens the lawyer from any participation in the
matter and allocates the lawyer none of the related fee. 9
The ABA adopted Model Rule 1.11 to address conflicts of interest spinning
out of the ever-turning “revolving door” of lawyers moving between
government service and private sector employment. 10 The term “revolving door”
Government and Private Practice, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2017, at 10, 10 (discussing government
lawyers’ need to understand conflicts of interest when leaving public service for private practice).
4. See SISK et al., supra note 1, at 357 (stating that conflicts of interest are the most common
ethics issue that average lawyers encounter).
5. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Model Rule
1.11(a)(1), which incorporates Model Rule 1.9(c) by reference, will be discussed later. See infra
Part IV.B.
6. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (imputing a
former government lawyer’s disqualification to his or her law firm unless the firm (1) timely
screens the lawyer from participating in the matter and apportions the lawyer no part of the related
fee; and (2) gives prompt written notice “to the appropriate government agency to enable it to
ascertain compliance” with Model Rule 1.11(b)(1)’s provisions).
7. Id. r. 1.11(c).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982–2013 279 (Art Garwin, ed. 2013).
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is not necessarily pejorative, however. Government agencies have diverse and
significant legal needs and are thus legitimately interested in recruiting talented
lawyers. 11 Qualified lawyers who might be attracted to government service are
often employed in law firms or in-house legal departments. Yet, those lawyers
might be reluctant to go to work for the government if they thought strict conflict
of interest rules would someday preclude—or at least severely limit—their
ability to leave the government for other professional opportunities. 12
Concurrently, private parties with legal matters involving governmental
entities often benefit from representation by former government lawyers with
deep knowledge of relevant government policies, procedures, or rules. 13 In some
cases, representation by former government lawyers may improve parties’
compliance with the law. 14 In these ways, the revolving door benefits both the
government and private parties. 15 Model Rule 1.11 accordingly reflects a
balancing of interests:
On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and
another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested
in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer
should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect
performance of the lawyer’s professional functions on behalf of the government.
Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to
confidential government information about the client’s adversary obtainable
only through the lawyer’s government service. On the other hand, the rules . . .
should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the
government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers
as well as to maintain high ethical standards. 16

11. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (commenting
on the government’s “legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers.”).
12. See Barnes ex rel. Est. of Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia, 266 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.D.C.
2003) (“Governments need and want good young lawyers to devote some time to public service
without depriving themselves of the ability to obtain employment thereafter.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 133 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2000) (“[G]overnment
agencies must be able to recruit able lawyers. If the experience gained could not be used after
lawyers left government service, recruiting lawyers would be more difficult.”).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 133 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2000).
14. Id.
15. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2018–2019, § 1.11-1, at 613 (2018) (“There is a
public interest in encouraging private lawyers to engage in public service and in having public
lawyers enter the private sector.”).
16. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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This article examines conflicts of interest when government lawyers leave
public service for private law practice. 17 Part II begins the examination with a
discussion of essential conflict of interest issues under Model Rule 1.11,
including the scope of a matter; former government lawyers’ personal and
substantial participation in a matter as required for their disqualification or
discipline; and obtaining a government agency’s informed consent to a former
government lawyer’s participation in a matter, which must then be confirmed in
writing.
Part III analyzes a law firm’s ability to avoid disqualification in a matter
based on the imputation of a former government lawyer’s conflict of interest.
This generally requires a law firm to screen the former government lawyer from
participation in the matter, apportion the lawyer no part of the associated fee,
and notify the appropriate government agency of the firm’s actions.
Finally, Part IV examines the limits on former government lawyers’
disclosure or use of certain government information in private practice. This
issue primarily arises in two situations: first, where the lawyers want to represent
clients in matters adverse to the lawyers’ former government agencies; and,
second, where the lawyers might use confidential government information about
a third party to obtain an unfair advantage over that party on behalf of a private
client.
II. ESSENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUES FOR FORMER GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS
A.

Overview

The basic conflict of interest rule covering government lawyers who leave
public service to enter or return to private practice is Model Rule 1.11(a)(2),
which states:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly
served as a public officer or employee of the government: . . . (2) shall not
otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless
the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in
writing, to the representation. 18

Four general principles regarding this rule require recognition at the outset.
First, where former government lawyers are concerned, Model Rule 1.11(a)(2)

17. “Government lawyers” as used in this article includes public employees, officers, or
officials with law degrees who may have administrative, managerial, or policy-making
responsibilities apart from, or in addition to, legal responsibilities.
18. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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replaces Model Rule 1.9(a), 19 which generally governs conflicts of interest in
successive representations. 20 Indeed, Model Rule 1.9(a) plays no role in
deciding whether former government lawyers have conflicts of interest linked to
their public service; 21 Model Rule 1.11 “occupies the field.” 22 To hold otherwise
would render Rule 1.11(a)(2) superfluous. 23 Such a result would be
unreasonable, because courts interpret rules of professional conduct according
to the same principles that govern statutory interpretation, 24 and courts generally
construe statutes so that no provision is rendered superfluous or reduced to
surplusage. 25 Furthermore, the differences between Model Rules 1.9(a) and
1.11(a)(2) regarding the standards for disqualifying allegedly conflicted
lawyers, the scope of the situations to which the rules apply, the imputation of
conflicts to other members of an offending lawyer’s firm, and the availability of
ethical screens to avoid imputed disqualification generally make overlapping
application of the rules impractical. 26

19. Id. r. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).
20. See, e.g., Martley v. City of Basehor, Kan., No. 19-02138-DDC-GEB, 2019 WL 6340132,
at *13 (D. Kan. Nov. 27, 2019) (concluding that Rule 1.9(a) cannot apply when Rule 1.11 applies);
Babineaux v. Foster, No. CIV.A. 04–1679, 2005 WL 711604, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2005)
(explaining that a former assistant city attorney’s potential disqualification was governed by Rule
1.11, not Rule 1.9); N.Y. Eth. Op. 1148, 2018 WL 1863105, at *3 (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm.
on Pro. Ethics 2018) (“Rule 1.11(a) ousts the application of Rule 1.9(a) in the context of
government lawyers.”).
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 97-409, at 2, 9–10 (1997) (hereinafter
ABA Formal Op. 97-409).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *4.
24. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 90 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ill. 2017); Law Offices
of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v. Fieger & Fieger, PC, 930 N.W.2d 416, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019)
(quoting Morris & Doherty, P.C. v. Lockwood, 672 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003));
Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Hanna, 513 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex. App. 2016).
25. See, e.g., Cascabell Cattle Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 955 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“[S]tatutes should ordinarily be construed so that no words constitute surplusage.”); Agnew v.
Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia, 920 F.3d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (recognizing that a statute should
not be interpreted in a way that renders part of it superfluous); Johnson v. State, 225 A.3d 44, 50
(Md. 2020) (“We read ‘the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” (quoting Philips v. State, 152 A.3d
712, 721–22 (Md. 2017))); Brown v. State, 939 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Neb. 2020) (“[A] court must
attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence
will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.” (footnote omitted)).
26. ABA Formal Op. 97-409, supra note 21, at 8–9; see, e.g., Martley v. City of Basehor,
Kan., No. 19-02138-DDC-GEB, 2019 WL 6340132, at *12 (D. Kan. Nov. 27, 2019) (applying Rule
1.11(a)(2) rather than 1.9(a) while observing that “the standard[s] of disqualification under the two
rules are not the same”).
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Second, while Model Rule 1.11(a)(2) certainly applies where a former
government lawyer within the rule’s purview represents a client adverse to the
government, the rule also applies where the interests of both the lawyer’s current
client and the government’s interests are aligned. 27 As the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals observed in In re White, 28 “[t]he prohibitions of Rule 1.11 are
not limited to side-switching; they apply even if the former public employee
espouses the same position in private practice as she did as a public official.” 29
There are three policy reasons for this approach:
First, prohibiting representation in a matter, even where consistent with the
government’s interest, diminishes the risk of subsequent misuse of information
obtained by the government. If a former government lawyer could make use of
confidential reports to an agency, for example, even in a cause that was
consistent with the government position, it would go beyond the original
purpose for making the reports and make it more difficult for the government to
obtain voluntary disclosures from members of the public. Second, the rule
removes an incentive to gain later advantages through methods of gathering
information that are available only to the government, such as a grand jury
investigation. Third, the rule removes an incentive to begin proceedings as a
government agent with a view to obtaining a subsequent advantage in private
practice, such as by filing a complementary action for a subsequent private
client. 30

Thus, and by way of example, Rule 1.11(a)(2) applies where a government
lawyer “enters private practice and takes the same position against the same
party” that the lawyer formerly advocated on the government’s behalf. 31
Third, Rule 1.11(a)(2) applies where the former government lawyer
participated personally and substantially in a matter as a public officer or
employee, regardless of whether the lawyer was functioning as a lawyer at the
time. 32 On the other hand, a lawyer in private practice who represents a
27. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating that
Model Rule 1.11(a)(2) applies “regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client.”).
28. 11 A.3d 1226 (D.C. 2011).
29. Id. at 1249.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 133 cmt. d (AM. L. INST.
2000).
31. City of Chi. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14 C 4361, 2014 WL 7146362, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 15, 2014).
32. See, e.g., Great Divide Wind Farm 2 LLC v. Aguilar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 949, 976 (D.N.M.
2019) (stating that the lawyer’s prior involvement in the matter as a Commissioner on the New
Mexico Public Regulation Commission rather than as a lawyer did not alter the court’s analysis
under New Mexico’s version of Rule 1.11(a)(2)); Filippi v. Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 722 F. Supp. 2d 295, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (disqualifying an associate and her law firm from
representing the defendant in an employment discrimination case where the associate was serving
as the school board’s vice president when the plaintiff filed written complaints and an EEOC
charge, the board discussed employment issues during the same time, and the associate in her role
as board vice president personally received two letters from the plaintiff’s lawyer regarding her
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government agency or entity does not thereby become a public employee within
the meaning of Rule 1.11. 33 The government’s payment of a private lawyer’s
legal fees does not convert the lawyer into a public employee. 34
Fourth, a former government lawyer’s disqualification under Rule
1.11(a)(2) does not depend on the movant having standing to seek such relief,
so a party does not have to be the lawyer’s client or former client to seek the
lawyer’s disqualification. 35 This position is consistent with the view outlined
above that former government lawyers’ conduct implicates public interests in
ways that other lawyers’ conduct does not.
B.

The Scope of a Matter

Moving beyond general principles and distilling Model Rule 1.11(a)(2) to
its key elements, the rule states that a former government lawyer generally
cannot represent a client “in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially” while in public service. 36 Under the
rule, discipline or disqualification is appropriate only if the matter the lawyer
participated in while with the government is the same matter that the lawyer is
handling in private practice. 37 It is not sufficient that the matters are substantially
related. 38 Accordingly, the initial issue when analyzing an alleged Rule
1.11(a)(2) violation is bounding or defining the “matters” in question. 39 This is
a case and fact-specific inquiry. 40

claims); Pa. Eth. Op. 2012-2, 2012 WL 7148213, at *1 (Phila. Bar Ass’n, Prof’l Guidance Comm.
2012) (“Rule 1.11 does not contemplate whether the specific duties of the public officer or
employee are categorized as attorney/non-attorney.”); Utah Eth. Op. 15-01, 2015 WL 3513297, at
*3 (Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm. 2015) (opining that Rule 1.11(a)(2) applied to a
lawyer who formerly served as a member of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole).
33. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, §1.11-3(a), at 614.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011 WL
5330790, at *3–6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2011) (noting the lack of a standing requirement in Rule 1.11
and granting the federal government’s motion to disqualify a defense lawyer in a qui tam case; the
lawyer, while a Kentucky Assistant Attorney General, participated in a state investigation into
alleged criminal abuse and neglect by caregivers in the defendants’ facility).
36. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
37. Pennington v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., No. 3:05-1075, 2006
WL 8445756, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 2, 2006); In re Hailey C., No. M2016-00818-COA-R3-PT,
2017 WL 4331039, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017); ABA Formal Op. 97-409, supra note 21,
at 6–7.
38. Compare MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer
who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in
the same or a substantially related matter. . . .” (emphasis added)).
39. See Pennington, 2006 WL 8445756, at *3.
40. See Green v. City of N.Y., No. 10 CIV. 8214(PKC), 2011 WL 2419864, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 2011) (“The scope of a matter is an intensely fact-specific inquiry.”).
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Model Rule 1.11(e) provides guidance for courts and lawyers who are
comparing matters to determine their relation. 41 First, Model Rule 1.11(e)(1)
defines the term “matter” to include “any judicial or other proceeding,
application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim,
controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter
involving a specific party or parties[.]” 42 In determining whether matters are the
same, a comment to Rule 1.11 explains that courts and lawyers should consider
whether the matters “involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties,
and the time elapsed.” 43 If two cases or proceedings involve the same facts or
the same or affiliated parties, they likely constitute the same matter. 44 In
contrast, a lawyer’s work on a case of the same type while in government service
but not involving the same parties as the one in which the lawyer plans to
participate in private practice does not make the matters the same. 45 Temporally,
the longer the time between the relevant cases, events, or representations, the
less likely it is that the matters are the same.46 In some cases, it may be necessary
for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether matters are
the same. 47
Some measure of prudence also must factor into defining a “matter.” For
instance, in Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Wilkes, 48 the West
Virginia Supreme Court properly concluded that the various stages in the
administrative review of an application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to
develop residential real estate were not separate matters for Rule 1.11(a)
purposes. 49 Indeed, the Wilkes court observed, the applicant’s argument that
each stage in the evaluation of a CUP application was a discrete matter failed as
a matter of common sense. 50
Second, Model Rule 1.11(e)(2) provides that a matter also includes “any
other matter” falling within a government agency’s conflict of interest rules. 51
For example, the federal Ethics in Government Act specifically restricts the
41. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
42. Id. r. 1.11(e)(1).
43. Id. r. 1.11 cmt. 10.
44. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(b), at 616.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 133 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
2000).
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sherlock, No. 2069, 2014 WL 10790103, at *4 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Oct. 3, 2014) (finding that two matters were not the same where they were separated by eight
years).
47. See, e.g., Royer v. Dillow, No. 13 CA 71, 2014 WL 98601, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2014) (noting the lack of documentation in the record and remanding the case to the trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing).
48. 655 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 2007).
49. Id. at 184–85.
50. Id. at 185.
51. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(e)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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advocacy activities of former officers and employees of the executive branch of
the U.S. government and the District of Columbia that may trigger Rule
1.11(a)(2) as well as providing independent grounds for disqualifying a former
government lawyer. 52 Some government agencies’ conflict-of-interest rules may
be more stringent than Model Rule 1.11. 53
Matters need not take the same form to be considered the same for Model
Rule 1.11(a)(2) purposes. 54 For example, a criminal investigation and
subsequent civil litigation may constitute the same matter when evaluating a
former government lawyer’s alleged conflict of interest. 55 A “matter” does not,
however, include general legislative, policy-making, rule-making, or regulatory
activity by a government agency. 56
Green v. City of New York 57 and In re National Prescription Opiate
Litigation 58 offer contrasting perspectives on whether two matters are the same.
In Green, Tkai Green sued the City of New York Department of Corrections
(DOC), some DOC employees, and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her
allegedly illegal strip-search in her jail cell. 59 She was represented by Gabriel
Harvis and Afsaan Saleem. 60 Harvis and Saleem previously worked as lawyers
in the New York City Law Department, where they “substantially and personally
52. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2018); see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 333 F. Supp. 2d 789, 793–97
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (relying on 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) to disqualify a former AUSA in a federal criminal
case).
53. See ELLEN J. BENNETT & HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 220 (9th ed. 2019); see, e.g., Yocum v. Commonwealth Gaming Control
Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 245–48 (Pa. 2017) (upholding Pennsylvania Gaming Act post-employment
restrictions that applied to a Gaming Board lawyer and which were broader than limitations
imposed by Rule 1.11).
54. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating that
a matter “may continue in another form.”).
55. See, e.g., Heyliger v. Collins, No. 3:11-CV-1293 (NAM/DEP), 2014 WL 910324, at *3–
6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2014) (disqualifying a lawyer who was defending several parties in a
defamation case connected to the lawyer’s criminal prosecution of the plaintiff while the lawyer
was an assistant district attorney); United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43DCR, 2011 WL 5330790, at *3–6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2011) (disqualifying a former Kentucky
Assistant Attorney General in a qui tam case. The lawyer, who was representing the defendants,
had previously participated in a state criminal investigation into abuse and neglect of patients in the
defendants’ facility); But see In re Hailey C., No. M2016-00818-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 4331039,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017) (holding that a man’s criminal prosecution for sexually
abusing his children and a subsequent civil action to terminate his parental rights as a result of the
abuse were separate matters).
56. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 34 (D.D.C. 1984); Nat’l
Bonded Warehouse Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 967, 972 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1989); ABA
Formal Op. 97-409, supra note 21, at 6 n.5.
57. No. 10 CIV. 8214(PKC), 2011 WL 2419864 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011).
58. No. 1:17-md-2804, 2019 WL 1274555 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2019).
59. Green, 2011 WL 2419864, at *1.
60. Id.
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represented the City of New York and certain DOC employees in class action
litigation concerning the lawfulness of strip-searches conducted of pretrial
detainees in DOC facilities.” 61 In her complaint, which Harvis and Saleem
prepared, Green alleged “that ‘[f]or decades, . . . [the] DOC has been aware of
the routine, unconstitutional use of strip-searches by staff at individual facilities
in the large multi-jail New York City Department of Correction.’” 62 The Green
court described this allegation as “a Monell-type claim against the City,” 63
meaning that the City could face potential liability “for constitutional
deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though [the]
custom ha[d] not received formal approval through the [City’s] official
decisionmaking channels.” 64
The defendants moved to disqualify Harvis and Saleem. 65 In response,
Green sought to amend her complaint to drop her Monell claim, but that effort
only highlighted Harvis’s and Saleem’s apparent conflict of interest. 66 The
Green court thus analyzed whether the two lawyers should be disqualified under
Rule 1.11. 67
An essential question for the Green court was whether Harvis’s and
Saleem’s prior representations of the City and DOC employees in the defense of
strip-search class actions and their current representation of Green were the same
matter for Rule 1.11 purposes. 68 In answering this question, the court observed
that determining “[t]he scope of a matter is an intensely fact-specific inquiry.” 69
Although matters are not the same merely because they involve a common legal
theory, they may be the same despite pertaining “to different lawsuits with
different parties.” 70 Ultimately, in deciding whether matters are the same, it is
essential to analyze the lawyer’s activities in the first matter. 71 “It is relevant
whether the lawyer merely gathered and produced documents, responded to
pleadings and attended court conferences or, rather, served as counselor and
advisor on the broad subject at hand.” 72
In this case, while lawyers for the City, Harvis and Saleem acquired
confidential information on DOC’s strip-search practices, and reviewed related
training materials and policies that could be essential to Green’s case. 73
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. (quoting Green’s complaint).
Id.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
Green, 2011 WL 2419864, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Green, 2011 WL 2419864, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although they were relatively junior lawyers at the time, they participated in risk
management discussions with senior DOC executives. 74 They also prepared
DOC employees for meetings with, and depositions by, opposing lawyers in
strip-search cases. 75 For these reasons, the court concluded that their prior
representations of the City and DOC employees included guidance on subjects
important to Green’s representation. 76 The matters were therefore the same
under Rule 1.11. 77
After distinguishing another Southern District of New York case that Harvis
and Saleem had apparently cited in their defense, the Green court granted the
defendants’ motion to disqualify the two lawyers. 78
The lawyer in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Carole Rendon,
had a stellar career as a federal prosecutor. 79 She joined the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Northern District of Ohio (USAO) as the Executive Assistant U.S.
Attorney in 2009, was promoted to First Assistant U.S. Attorney in 2010, and
was appointed as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio in 2016.80
After being forced to resign by President Trump in March 2017, she joined the
Cleveland office of BakerHostetler in June 2017. 81
Upon joining BakerHostetler, Rendon began defending the pharmaceutical
company Endo in litigation in the Northern District of Ohio in which several
Ohio cities and counties sued Endo and other opioid manufacturers and
distributors. 82 When a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) case was created in
December 2017, she became the defendants’ co-liaison counsel. 83
Unfortunately for Rendon, trouble lurked in her time in the USAO, which
had “recognized the opioid epidemic as ‘an unprecedented health care and law
enforcement crisis in Northern Ohio,’” and in 2013—while she was First
Assistant U.S. Attorney—formed “the Heroin and Opioid Task Force” (Task
Force). 84 The Task Force was comprised of courts, law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors’ offices, members of the media, hospitals, health care agencies and
providers, and others, all focused on tackling the perceived opioid crisis from

74. Id.
75. See Green, 2011 WL 2419864, at *1 (observing that in the process of meeting with DOC
employees, the lawyers “presumably guid[ed] and remind[ed] them about what to say and do.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *3 (distinguishing McBean v. City of N.Y., 02 CIV. 5426(GEL), 2003 WL 21277115
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003)).
79. No. 1:17-md-2804, 2019 WL 1274555 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2019), at *1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. In re Nat’l Prescription, 2019 WL 1274555, at *1.
84. Id.
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different angles. 85 Rendon became the Task Force Chair when she was
appointed U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio. 86
In 2019, one of the MDL plaintiffs, the City of Cleveland, moved to
disqualify Rendon from representing Endo based on Rule 1.11(a). 87 It was clear
that Rendon had “participated personally and substantially as a public officer on
the Task Force.” 88 The parties disputed whether the Task Force qualified as a
“matter” under Rule 1.11(a), and if so, whether it was the same matter as the
MDL litigation involving Endo. 89
The district court reasoned that Rendon’s conduct did not implicate Rule
1.11(a). 90 The court explained that because Rule 1.11(a) basically “prevents
‘side-switching’” when a government lawyer enters private practice, the matter
the former government lawyer worked on must be the same as the matter at hand,
rather than being “substantially related” as Rule 1.9 requires for private lawyers’
former client conflicts. 91 With that background, the plaintiffs’ urged
interpretation of Rule 1.11 was overly ambitious. 92 The Task Force was a
collection of agencies, organizations, and individuals that jointly aspired to solve
the opioid crisis in Ohio communities. 93 The MDL cases were civil actions
brought against manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of prescription
opiates to recover the cost of addressing Ohio’s opioid crisis. 94 The MDL
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—Endo among them—falsely marketed
their drugs and deficiently monitored suspicious order reports. 95 Given these
differences, the court concluded, the Task Force and the MDL litigation could
not be considered the “same matter” under a fair reading of Rule 1.11. 96 Nor had
Rendon switched sides in the MDL litigation. 97 While in the USAO, she never
investigated Endo, nor did she ever litigate against the company. 98
To the extent it was interpreting the term “matter” narrowly, the In re
National Prescription court explained, that approach was justified by the
examples provided in Ohio’s version of Rule 1.11 and by Sixth Circuit authority
reciting that disqualification motions are disfavored and should be granted

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
In re Nat’l Prescription, 2019 WL 1274555, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Nat’l Prescription, 2019 WL 1274555, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Nat’l Prescription, 2019 WL 1274555, at *3.
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sparingly. 99 The court closed its discussion by reiterating that the Task Force
and MDL litigation were different matters. 100
While Rendon and her law firm won the battle over this issue, they soon lost
a major campaign in the disqualification war. Two of the MDL plaintiffs further
argued that they had shared “confidential non-public information” with the Task
Force that had reached Rendon and which, if exploited by Endo, could
“materially prejudice” them. 101 The court consequently found it necessary to
disqualify Rendon and her law firm from representing Endo in the MDL cases
involving those plaintiffs. 102
C. Personal and Substantial Participation
If a court applying Model Rule 1.11(a)(2) concludes that two or more
matters are the same, it must then determine whether the former government
lawyer “participated personally and substantially” in the matter while in public
service. 103 The rule’s use of the conjunction “and” is critical; a former
government lawyer’s participation in the matter while in public service must
have been both personal and substantial to warrant disqualification. 104
For a lawyer to have participated personally in a matter for Rule 1.11(a)
purposes, the lawyer must have been directly involved in it; the lawyer’s
employment in the same office or agency as the lawyers who actually handled
the matter does not count. 105 The substantial participation requirement means
that a lawyer’s involvement in a matter on a cursory, ministerial, or superficial
basis will not support discipline or disqualification. 106 For example, a lawyer
who simply signs and files a form pleading, such as an answer generally denying
a plaintiff’s allegations, does not thereby substantially participate in the related
matter. 107 A lawyer’s participation in a single meeting while a public employee
99. Id. at *4 (quoting In re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co., 237 B.R. 322, 337 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999),
aff’d, 5 F. App’x 396 (6th Cir. 2001)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id.
103. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
104. Great Divide Wind Farm 2 LLC v. Aguilar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 949, 975–76 (D.N.M. 2019);
Sec. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 718 P.2d 985, 987 (Ariz. 1986); see, e.g., Arroyo v. City of
Buffalo, No. 15-CV-753A(F), 2017 WL 3085835, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (refusing to
disqualify a former assistant district attorney who was personally involved in the matter but not
substantially so; there was no evidence that the lawyer participated in an official investigation,
deliberations regarding possible criminal charges, or the like); United States v. Dancy, No.
3:08CR189, 2008 WL 4329414, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2008) (reversing a defense lawyer’s
disqualification where additional evidence revealed that while she was personally involved in the
matter while a prosecutor, her involvement was insubstantial).
105. SISK et al., supra note 1, at 422.
106. Great Divide, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
107. Richards v. Lewis, No. CIV.A.05-0069, 2005 WL 2645001, at *4 (D.V.I. Oct. 14, 2005).
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or official is not normally considered “substantial.” 108 A lawyer who held a
supervisory position with a government agency and simply received updates or
reports on a matter, or signed off on a matter as a function of her office, should
not be held to have substantially participated in the matter. 109 Likewise, a former
government lawyer who merely heard other lawyers in her office debating or
discussing a matter cannot be said to have personally and substantially
participated in the matter. 110
The personal and substantial participation requirement was imported into
the Model Rules from the federal Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 111
Logically looking to the Act for guidance in applying these terms:
To participate “personally” means directly, and includes the participation of a
subordinate when actually directed by the former Government employee in the
matter. “Substantially,” means that the employee’s involvement must be of
significance to the matter, or form a basis for a reasonable appearance of such
significance. It requires more than official responsibility, knowledge,
perfunctory involvement, or involvement on an administrative or peripheral
issue. A finding of substantiality should be based not only on the effort devoted
to a matter, but on the importance of the effort. While a series of peripheral
involvements may be insubstantial, the single act of approving or participation

108. Ex Parte Utils. Bd. of the City of Tuskegee, 274 So. 3d 229, 234–35 (Ala. 2018).
109. See, e.g., Sec. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 718 P.2d at 987 (“Matters involving Security General
were before Low’s department during his term as director, but there is no evidence that he ever
‘participated personally and substantially’ in them. . . . On the contrary, . . . Low did no more than
sign orders put before him by his staff.”); In re Coleman, 895 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (App. Div. 2010)
(explaining that a government lawyer did not participate personally and substantially in every case
referred to his department simply because he was responsible for reviewing all incoming cases and
assigning them to subordinate lawyers); State ex rel. Clifford v. W. Va. Office of Disciplinary
Couns., 745 S.E.2d 225, 235–37 (W. Va. 2013) (discussing a former county prosecuting attorney
who merely received updates on the matter and participated in related press conferences while in
office); AK Eth. Op. 95-2, 1995 WL 928996, at *3 (Alaska Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm. 1995)
(concluding that a lawyer’s personal and substantial participation in a matter requires “more than
general supervisory duties or perfunctory approval or disapproval of an employee’s actions.”).
Alternatively,
even where the former solicitor’s involvement in a particular case was minor because the
matter was primarily handled by an assistant solicitor, the prosecution was still handled
under his supervision, because each of the assistant solicitors serve at the pleasure of the
solicitor and, inferentially, under his supervision and control. . . . That could be construed
to qualify as “personal and substantial” involvement sufficient to cause a conflict to arise
under Rule 1.11.
S.C. Adv. Op. 97-12, 1997 WL 582914, at *2 (S.C. Bar, Ethics Advisory Comm. 1997) (citation
omitted).
110. Dugar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Dist. 299, No. 92 C 1621, 1992 WL 142302, at *6
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 1992).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(B) (2018).
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in a critical step may be substantial. It is essential that the participation be related
to a “particular matter involving a specific party.” 112

Helpful though this language may be, it does not change the fact that
whether a former government lawyer participated personally and substantially
in a matter is a case-specific call. Babineaux v. Foster 113 and Registe v. State 114
demonstrate the variability of case outcomes when deciding the level of a former
government lawyer’s involvement in a matter.
In Babineaux, Tysonia Babineaux sued the City of Hammond, Louisiana
and its mayor (collectively the City) for employment discrimination after she
was fired from her City job in July 2003. 115 She was represented by Douglas
Brown. 116 He had served as an Assistant City Attorney through the end of 2002,
when the mayor took office. 117 He then entered private practice and began
representing plaintiffs in lawsuits against the City. 118
The City moved to disqualify Brown based on an employment grievance
that Babineaux filed in 2001, while Brown was still an Assistant City
Attorney. 119 In so moving, the City alleged that Babineaux’s current lawsuit was
substantively similar in all material respects to her 2001 grievance. 120 Babineaux
countered that disqualification was inappropriate because all the acts giving rise
to her lawsuit occurred after Brown left the City for private practice. 121 Brown
also argued that the disqualification motion was naked retaliation for his
repeated representation of plaintiffs suing the City. 122
In seeking Brown’s disqualification, the City relied in part on Louisiana’s
version of Model Rule 1.11(a) and argued that Brown had to be removed from
Babineaux’s case because he “was ‘personally and arguably substantially
involved as counsel’” for the prior mayor in connection with Babineaux’s 2001
grievance. 123 The Babineaux court noted that neither the Fifth Circuit nor the
Louisiana Supreme Court had “clearly defined what constitutes ‘personal and
substantial’ participation” in a matter. 124 At best, the Fifth Circuit had indicated
that a lawyer’s tenuous and nominal ties to a matter did not amount to personal

112. United States v. Clark, 333 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (quoting 5 C.F.R. §
2637.201(d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. No. CIV.A. 04-1679, 2005 WL 711604, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2005).
114. 697 S.E.2d 804, 811 (Ga. 2010).
115. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *1.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5.
124. Id.
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and substantial involvement. 125 In terms of other authority, another district court
had stated that a former government lawyer may be found to have substantially
participated in a matter where the lawyer’s “involvement was of significance to
the matter, or sufficient to create a ‘reasonable appearance of such
significance.’” 126 In addition, an old ABA ethics opinion applying a predecessor
ethics rule had explained that the similar term “substantial responsibility”
required “a much closer and more direct relationship than that of a mere
perfunctory approval or disapproval of the matter in question.” 127 Rather, the
term “contemplate[d] a responsibility requiring the official to become personally
involved to an important, material degree, in the investigative or deliberative
processes regarding the transactions or facts in question.” 128
With those authorities in mind, the Babineaux court found no evidence that
Brown investigated Babineaux’s 2001 grievance while he was an Assistant City
Attorney, or even that he spent material time on the matter. 129 While Brown
acknowledged that as an Assistant City Attorney he apparently had received
copies of two letters concerning Babineaux’s grievance, he swore in a filed
declaration that he did not recall anything about the letters—including receiving
them. 130 He further swore that any involvement he might have had in
Babineaux’s 2001 grievance was confined to receiving the two letters. 131 Brown
denied participating in any probe of Babineaux’s 2001 grievance, and he further
denied providing associated legal advice to the former mayor. 132 Conspicuously,
the City offered no evidence to refute Brown’s exculpatory statements. 133
Professional responsibility is self-enforcing, the Babineaux court reminded
the parties, and lawyers are presumed to be ethical until proven otherwise.134 At
bottom, Brown’s “cursory involvement” in his client’s 2001 grievance did “not
rise to the level of ‘personal and substantial’ participation in a matter which
would require his disqualification pursuant to Rule 1.11.” 135
Registe v. State 136 arose out of a murder case in which the accused slayer,
Michael Registe, was defended by a former assistant district attorney (ADA),

125. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *5 (citing Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 560 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
126. Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 333 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794 (E.D. Wis. 2004)).
127. Id. at *5–6 (quoting ABA Formal Ethics Op. 342 (1975)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. Id. at *6 (quoting ABA Formal Ethics Op. 342 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.
130. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *6.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Wallace ex rel. Ne. Utils. v. Fox, 7 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137 (D. Conn. 1998)).
135. Babineaux, 2005 WL 711604, at *6.
136. 697 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 2010).
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Stacey Jackson. 137 Jackson began his career as an ADA in 2000. 138 In 2005,
Registe, a career criminal, committed multiple crimes, including car theft and
aggravated assault. 139 By 2007, Jackson had been promoted to Senior ADA and
supervised a small trial team of ADAs. 140 In July 2007, a robber killed two
people in separate incidents; the police suspected that Registe was the
perpetrator. 141 Registe evaded arrest by fleeing the country with his sister’s
suspected assistance. 142 That was the situation in January 2008 when Jackson,
who was not involved in Registe’s car theft and aggravated assault cases,
enlisted the U.S. Marshals Service in the hunt for Registe in connection with the
two murders. 143 To aid the marshals’ pursuit, Jackson signed three search
warrant applications to obtain telephone records for Registe and his sister. 144 In
signing the warrant applications, Jackson certified to the court that the phone
records were “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” to
locate Registe, and that the records would provide leads that would enable his
apprehension. 145
In July 2008, Jackson resigned as an ADA and entered private practice. 146
In late August 2008, a grand jury indicted Registe for the 2007 murders. 147
Registe was arrested in the Caribbean the next day and was soon indicted in the
aggravated assault case. 148
ADAs from Jackson’s former trial team handled both indictments. 149 After
the aggravated assault indictment, Chris Samra, an investigator in the DA’s
office who had worked with Jackson, asked Jackson if he would be defending
Registe. 150 According to Samra, Jackson said that he could not represent Registe
because he had worked on the murder case as an ADA. 151
In July 2009, Registe was finally repatriated to stand trial for murder, auto
theft, and aggravated assault. 152 Surprisingly, in August 2009, Jackson entered
his appearance as Registe’s defense counsel. 153 Predictably, the State moved to
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.
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disqualify Jackson from representing Registe in the murder case “because of his
work on the case while in the DA’s office.” 154 The State subsequently moved to
disqualify Jackson in the car theft and aggravated assault cases because it
planned to introduce them as “similar transaction evidence” at Registe’s murder
trial. 155
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court disqualified Jackson
in all three cases. 156 Registe appealed the trial court’s order to the Georgia
Supreme Court. 157
One of the issues on appeal was whether Jackson had personally and
substantially participated in Registe’s murder case while serving as an ADA,
thereby justifying his disqualification under Rule 1.11(a). 158 Registe contended
that the personal and substantial participation standard is “difficult to apply
where the lawyer in question was ‘the chief official in some vast office or
organization,’ because that status ‘does not ipso facto give that government
official or employee the “substantial responsibility” contemplated by the rule in
regard to all the minutiae of facts lodged within that office.’” 159
Registe’s argument did not persuade the court, which had no difficulty
applying the personal and substantial participation test to the facts presented. 160
Rather than being a remote supervisor or office head:
[Jackson] personally applied on behalf of the State for three criminal search
warrants and certified as an officer of the court that the warrants were justified
because they were “relevant and material” to the State’s “ongoing criminal
investigation” to locate a fugitive wanted for murder and that the requested
information would “provide leads which will aid in locating and apprehending
the fugitive.” 161

Registe apparently argued in the alternative that Jackson was not personally
and substantially involved in the murder case while employed as an ADA
because he signed the warrant applications without reading or understanding
them, or because he lacked a factual basis for his representations to the court in
the applications. 162 The Registe court gave no credence to these arguments, and,
in dismissing them, cautioned that Jackson’s purported misrepresentation of the
bases for the warrants would raise serious questions about his professional

154. Id. at 806–07.
155. Id. at 807.
156. Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 807.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 811.
159. Id. (quoting Outdoor Advert. Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. Garden Club of Ga., Inc., 527 S.E.2d
856, 860 (Ga. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id.
161. Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 811.
162. Id.
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ethics. 163 Finally, Jackson was doomed by Samra’s testimony at the
disqualification hearing that Jackson had said that he could not represent Registe
because he had worked on his murder case. 164
In conclusion, Rule 1.11, among others, prohibited Jackson’s representation
of Registe. 165 Consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
disqualifying Jackson in all three cases. 166
D. Informed Consent by the Government Agency, Confirmed in Writing
Of course, even if a former government lawyer is apparently disqualified
from a client’s representation because of a conflict of interest under Model Rule
1.11(a)(2), the lawyer may nonetheless represent the client if “the appropriate
government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the
representation.” 167 A government agency’s mere knowledge of a conflict is not
sufficient for informed consent. 168 Rather, informed consent requires the
agency’s agreement “to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” 169 A
lawyer who withholds or glosses over information pertinent to the government
agency’s decision whether to consent to a conflict of interest assumes the risk
that any consent obtained will prove to be invalid, that she will face discipline
for violating Rule 1.11(a)(2), or both. 170 An Unnamed Attorney v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n is illustrative of this. 171
An Unnamed Attorney involved the Kentucky Supreme Court’s approval of
a lawyer’s private reprimand for professional misconduct; however, the court
and parties believed that the decision had educational value for other lawyers if
published in redacted form, hence the unusual case caption. 172 In a nutshell, the
lawyer in An Unnamed Attorney once worked as an in-house lawyer for an
unidentified Kentucky city (the City) handling civil matters. 173 At some point
prior to 2015, he left the City for private practice. 174 In 2015, a client retained
him to represent her in a zoning permit dispute that potentially implicated the

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Registe, 697 S.E.2d at 811.
167. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
168. See id. r. 1.0(e) (defining “informed consent”).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., An Unnamed Att’y v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 568 S.W.3d 347, 348–49 (Ky. 2019)
(reprimanding the lawyer privately after the trial court disqualified him).
171. 568 S.W.3d 347 (Ky. 2019).
172. Id. at 347.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 347–48.
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City. 175 The lawyer then approached his former employer to seek consent to
represent the woman in the zoning permit dispute, recognizing that the City
could potentially be a party to the dispute. 176 The City initially consented to the
lawyer’s representation of the woman, but revoked its consent and moved to
disqualify the lawyer “when he filed a lengthy complaint against [the] City with
issues extending well beyond the original zoning permit dispute.” 177
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and disqualified the
lawyer. 178 Kentucky disciplinary authorities then charged him with violating
Rules 1.9(c) and 1.11(a), which led to this decision. 179
According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the lawyer did not achieve
informed consent when, after the City agreed to allow him to represent his client
“in a simple zoning permit dispute with the potential for a lawsuit, he filed a
thirty-seven-page complaint alleging [that the] City violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act and other non-zoning issues.” 180 The court
explained that before filing the offending complaint, the lawyer should have
gone back to the City to seek its consent to his representation of his new client
with respect to the claims actually asserted. 181 Although it is unlikely that the
City would have consented to the representation on those terms and the lawyer
would have lost a client as a result, he at least would have complied with the
applicable ethics rules and avoided professional discipline. 182
The lawyer in An Unnamed Lawyer plainly did not share enough
information with the City for it to fairly consent to his adverse representation.
Analyzing informed consent more broadly, the amount of information necessary
for a client to grant informed consent to a conflict under Model Rules 1.7(b) or
1.9(a) varies, but often pivots on the client’s level of sophistication, education,
and experience, and whether the client has independent counsel. 183 The more
experienced a client is in legal matters, and in making decisions of the type
involved in the case in which consent is sought in particular, the less information
and explanation needed for a client’s consent to be informed. 184 Generally, a
client who is represented by independent counsel is presumed to have given
informed consent to the proposed course of conduct. 185 This is true regardless of

175. Id. at 348.
176. An Unnamed Att’y, 568 S.W.3d at 348.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 348–49.
181. An Unnamed Att’y, 568 S.W.3d at 349.
182. Id.
183. Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401–03 (N.D. Tex.
2013); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
184. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
185. Id.
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whether the other lawyer is the client’s in-house counsel or an outside lawyer. 186
The same principles that apply to a lawyer obtaining informed consent to a
conflict of interest in other contexts should apply equally to a former government
lawyer seeking a government agency’s consent to a conflict under Model Rule
1.11(a)(2). 187
As for the writing requirement, it is important to note that Model Rule
1.11(a)(2) does not mandate a government agency’s written consent to a
representation; it requires that the agency’s consent be confirmed in writing. 188
Thus, a lawyer may obtain the agency’s consent in a meeting or over the
telephone, for example, and comply with the rule through a confirming letter, or
e-mail or text message. E-mail and text messages are “writings” in this
context. 189 State rules of professional conduct, however, may vary. 190
III. AVOIDING IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION
Under Model Rule 1.11(b), when a former government lawyer is
disqualified from a representation under Rule 1.11(a), all other lawyers in the
law firm are also disqualified from the representation unless (1) the former
government lawyer “is timely screened from any participation in the matter and
is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and (2) written notice is promptly
given to the appropriate government agency to allow it to ascertain compliance
with the provisions of [Rule 1.11(b)].” 191 A law firm must satisfy both prongs
of Model Rule 1.11(b) to prevent a former government lawyer’s conflict of
interest from being imputed to all lawyers in the firm and thereby disqualifying
the firm as a whole. 192
A.

Screening

To start, lawyers are considered to be “screened” where they are isolated
“from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures
186. Galderma Labs., 927 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
187. In An Unnamed Attorney, the City was either the lawyer’s current or former private client
at the time he sued it on behalf of his new client. See An Unnamed Att’y v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 568
S.W.3d 347, 347–48 (Ky. 2019) (“When Unnamed Attorney left the full-time employment of City
for private practice, he still contractually represented City in some matters.”).
188. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
189. Id. r. 1.0(n).
190. See, e.g., CAL. RULES PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (CAL. STATE BAR 2018) (requiring a
government agency’s “informed written consent” to a former government lawyer’s representation
of a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
official or employee).
191. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
192. See, e.g., State v. Clausen, 104 So. 3d 410, 412 (La. 2012) (affirming the law firm’s
disqualification because the former prosecutor did not affirm that he would not receive any part of
the fee for the subject representation and the law firm did not give the State prompt written notice
that it had hired the former prosecutor).
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within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect
information that [they are] obligated to protect” under rules of professional
conduct or other law. 193 It should go without saying, but simply instructing
former government lawyers not to discuss the matters they are prohibited from
participating in with other lawyers or staff members, without more, is not a
reasonable screen. 194
As for implementing an effective screen, the basic ground rules for
screening in other contexts apply equally to firms’ efforts at screening former
government lawyers. First, it is important for the law firm the former
government lawyer is joining to identify the conflict of interest before the lawyer
joins the firm or as soon as possible thereafter. 195 In any case, the firm should
erect a screen as soon as reasonably possible after it identifies the conflict. 196
The longer a firm waits, the less likely that a court will consider the screen to be
timely. 197
Second, the firm should promptly notify lawyers and staff of the screen. 198
The form of the notice may depend on the firm, but written notice is preferable
because (a) it is the easiest way for the firm to be able to demonstrate that it gave
such notice; and (b) it best ensures the clarity, consistency, and thoroughness of
the notice. 199 Again, depending on the firm, notice may go to all lawyers and
193. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(k) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
194. Essex Equity Holdings USA, LLC v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 909 N.Y.S.2d 285, 300 (Sup.
Ct. 2010).
195. See Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 01 CIV. 2112(WHP), 2002 WL 441194, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2002) (“A screening device implemented only after a disqualified lawyer has
joined the firm, in an instance where the firm knew of the problem at the time of her arrival, further
diminishes the possibility that screening remedies the conflict. . . .”).
196. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“In order to
be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law
firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.”); see also Mitchell, 2002
WL 441194, at *9 (stating that where the concern is a lawyer’s acquisition of confidential
information, “the screening measures must have been established from the first moment the
conflicted attorney transferred to the firm or, at a minimum, when the firm first received actual
notice of the conflict.”).
197. See, e.g., Stimson Lumber Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV-10-79-M-DWM-JC, 2011 WL
124303, at *5 (D. Mont. Jan. 14, 2011) (holding that waiting four months to screen a lawyer was
too long); Mitchell, 2002 WL 441194, at *10 (explaining that a delay of nearly two months in
erecting a screen was unreasonable).
198. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
199. See CDM Smith v. Mut. Redevelopment Houses, Inc., No. 653573/2016, 2017 WL
378567, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2017) (stating that the lack of “a physical, dated notice
circulated within [the firm] advising everyone there that [the lawyer] had to be screened from
participation” in the matter led “to an almost complete lack of confidence in the efficacy of the
proposed screen.”); Essex Equity Holdings, 909 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (“A writing would have
memorialized the terms, timing, scope and form of the notification and given an indication of which
personnel received the notification, as well as offering proof that the other lawyers actually had
received the notification, all of which would have helped to overcome the claim of impropriety.”).
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staff, or it may be sent to those lawyers and staff members working on the matter
from which the former government lawyer is being screened. A firm may further
wish to identify the screened matter on its intranet.
Third, the law firm should implement information technology controls to
prevent the screened lawyer from gaining access to electronic files and
documents related to the screened matter.
Fourth, a firm should establish physical measures to enforce the screen. For
example, the firm should clearly mark paper files related to the screened matter,
post notices on relevant file cabinets or shelves, or place notices or screening
instructions in individual files so that the screened lawyer knows that materials
located there are off-limits. 200 Depending on the facts, a firm may wish to
consider other alternatives, such as locating the screened lawyer’s office away
from those of lawyers and staff members who are working on the screened
matter.
Fifth, the law firm should take documented measures to maintain the screen.
For example, the firm should periodically remind lawyers and staff of the
screen’s existence and scope, 201 and update information regarding the screen as
necessary. 202 Similarly, the firm should reasonably monitor compliance with the
screen.
B.

Fee Apportionment

In addition to requiring that a former government lawyer be screened from
a matter in which she participated personally and substantially, a law firm
attempting to avoid imputed disqualification must further see that the lawyer is
apportioned no part of the fee earned from that matter. 203 That is easier said than
done. Apportioning fees in individual matters to individual lawyers in a law firm
of any size is effectively impossible under most modern compensation
systems. 204 Fortunately, a comment to Model Rule 1.11 recognizes this practical
problem and explains that Rule 1.11(b)(1) “does not prohibit a lawyer from
receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent

200. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Ky. 2016) (recommending
that a copy of the office screening policy be placed in every screened file and that an appropriate
screening notice be posted in a prominent place near any screened files).
201. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
202. For example, new lawyers or staff who join the firm may need to know that they cannot
speak with the screened lawyer about the matter at issue.
203. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
204. Although so-called “eat what you kill” partner compensation systems are now rare, it
would be possible under such a system to see that a former government lawyer was apportioned no
part of the fee earned from a matter from which the lawyer was screened. For an explanation of eat
what you kill compensation schemes, see MICHAEL DOWNEY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW FIRM
PRACTICE 139–40 (2010).
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agreement.” 205 Thus, to use a common example, a former government lawyer
who is an equity partner in a firm remains entitled to her full partnership draws
and distributions even though those payments will include money from the
firm’s complete portfolio of matters—including the screened matter. 206 The
lawyer may not, however, “receive compensation directly relating the lawyer’s
compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.” 207
C. Written Notice to the Government Agency
Finally, to avoid imputed disqualification, the former government lawyer or
the lawyer’s firm must promptly give the appropriate government agency
written notice that the lawyer has been timely screened from participation in the
matter and that he or she will receive no part of the associated fee. 208 Failure to
give the required notice will result in the law firm’s disqualification. 209
To satisfy the Model Rule 1.11(b)(2) promptness requirement, the lawyer or
firm should give the appropriate government agency written notice “as soon as
practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.” 210 Simply informing
the government agency that the lawyer is being screened from a matter is
inadequate under the rule. 211 Rather, the notice must describe the matter and the
law firm’s screening procedures in sufficient detail to allow the government
agency to object to the firm’s representation and to the firm’s screening
procedures if necessary. 212 Critically, the agency’s consent to the firm’s
screening methods is not required. 213 If the agency believes the firm’s screening
procedures are inadequate, its choices are to (1) try to persuade the firm to
reasonably modify its procedures in the hope that the firm will do so to avoid
any related dispute; or (2) challenge the firm’s screening procedures in court.

205. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
206. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(e)(4), at 622.
207. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
208. Id. r. 1.11(b)(2).
209. See, e.g., State v. Clausen, 104 So. 3d 410, 412 (La. 2012) (affirming the law firm’s
disqualification because the former prosecutor did not affirm that he would not receive any part of
the fee for the subject representation and the law firm did not give the State prompt written notice
that it had hired the former prosecutor).
210. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
211. Essex Equity Holdings USA, LLC v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 909 N.Y.S.2d 285, 301 (Sup.
Ct. 2010).
212. SISK et al., supra note 1, at 426.
213. Id.; ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(e)(3), at 621.
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IV. THE USE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN PRIVATE PRACTICE
A.

Overview

Model Rule 1.11 limits former government lawyers’ use of certain
government information in private practice in two ways. First, where former
government lawyers want to represent private clients in matters adverse to their
former agencies, Model Rule 1.9(c) may restrict their ability to do so if in their
new representations they would be required to use or reveal information relating
to the representation of their former government clients. 214 This is because
Model Rule 1.11(a)(1) makes former government lawyers subject to Model Rule
1.9(c), which provides that:
(c) [a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present
or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to
a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules
would permit or require with respect to a client. 215

Because Model Rules 1.9(c)(1) and (2) have no analogs in Model Rule 1.11, this
is the rare—indeed, only—circumstance in which Model Rule 1.9 reaches
former government lawyers. 216
Second, Model Rule 1.11(c) prohibits a former government lawyer from
using confidential government information to the material disadvantage of a
third party in a matter in which the third party and the lawyer’s client are
adverse. 217 Model Rule 1.11(c) states:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that
the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person
acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent
a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which
the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. 218

Under both Model Rule 1.11(a)(1) and 1.11(c), a former government
lawyer’s firm may avoid imputed disqualification by timely screening the
lawyer from participation in the matter, but the screening requirements are
different. To avoid disqualification under Model Rule 1.11(a)(1), which imports
Model Rule 1.9(c), the firm must satisfy the screening requirements of Model

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

ABA Formal Op. 97-409, supra note 21, at 13.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
ABA Formal Op. 97-409, supra note 21, at 13.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
Id.
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Rule 1.11(b). 219 Thus, a firm must give the appropriate government agency
written notice of the matter and the firm’s screening procedures, and apportion
the lawyer no part of the associated fee. 220 In comparison, to avoid imputed
disqualification under Model Rule 1.11(c), the law firm need only screen the
former government lawyer and apportion the lawyer no part of the fee from the
screened matter; the law firm does not have to notify the appropriate government
agency of its actions. 221 This difference is explained by the fact that Model Rule
1.11(c) protects third parties that are adverse to the client of a former government
lawyer—it does not prevent the former government lawyer from using
confidential government information against her former government client. 222
Accordingly, the government has no arguable need to evaluate or verify the
former government lawyer’s law firm’s compliance with Rule 1.11.
B.

Model Rule 1.9(c) via Model Rule 1.11(a)(1)

Model Rules 1.11(a)(1) and (c) are both concerned with former government
lawyers’ duty of confidentiality. While lawyers’ duties to clients generally
terminate upon conclusion of the representation, the duty of confidentiality does
not. 223 Model Rule 1.9(c) extends lawyers’ duty of confidentiality under Model
Rule 1.6(a) to former clients. 224 By incorporating Model Rule 1.9(c), Model
Rule 1.11(a)(1) then extends former government lawyers’ duty of confidentiality
to their former agencies. 225 Again, Model Rule 1.9(c) prohibits a lawyer who
has formerly represented a client in a matter from (1) using information relating
to the representation to the former client’s disadvantage, except as permitted by
the Model Rules or when the information has become generally known; and (2)
revealing information relating to the former client’s representation, except as
permitted by the Model Rules. 226 “The terms ‘reveal’ or ‘disclose’ on the one
hand and ‘use’ on the other describe different activities or types of conduct even
though they may—but need not—occur at the same time.” 227
Lawyers may breach their duty of confidentiality by not only disclosing
information obtained from clients, but also by revealing information available

219. See id. r. 1.11(b) (stating that its screening requirements apply “[w]hen a lawyer is
disqualified under paragraph (a)”).
220. See supra Part III.c.
221. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
222. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(g), at 623.
223. Id. § 1.6-5(a), at 284.
224. Pallon v. Roggio, Nos. 04–3625(JAP), 06–1068(FLW), 2006 WL 2466854, at *7 (D.N.J.
Aug. 24, 2006); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 479, at 1–2 (2017)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 479]; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
225. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
226. Id. r. 1.9(c).
227. ABA Formal Op. 479, supra note 224, at 2.
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from sources other than their clients—including publicly available
information. 228 The fact that information about a client is available somewhere
in the public domain does not mean that it is known by, or readily available to,
everyone with whom the client deals. 229
By the same token, and as Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) expressly recognizes, where
the former client’s information has become generally known, there is no real
purpose served by requiring a lawyer to continue to protect it. 230 The “generally
known exception” to former client confidentiality under Model Rule 1.9(c)(1),
however, is narrow.
First, the generally known exception applies only to the use of a former
client’s information, and not to the disclosure or revelation of a former client’s

228. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 654 N.E.2d 1128, 1129–30 (Ind. 1995) (holding that the
lawyer violated Rule 1.6(a) by revealing information “readily available from public sources”); Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 766 (Iowa 2010) (holding that
“confidentiality is breached when an attorney discloses information learned through the attorneyclient relationship even if that information is otherwise publicly available.”); Law. Disciplinary Bd.
v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 861–62 (W. Va. 1995) (stating that lawyers’ duty of confidentiality
“is not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record.”).
229. See, e.g., Pallon, 2006 WL 2466854, at *7 (“‘Generally known’ does not only mean that
the information is of public record. . . . The information must be within the basic understanding and
knowledge of the public.” (citation omitted)); In re Johnson, No. 96-O-05705, 2000 WL 1682427,
at *15 (Cal. Bar Ct. Oct. 26, 2000) (concluding that the lawyer’s disclosure of a client’s publicly
available conviction, but which was not easily discoverable, violated the duty of confidentiality);
People v. Braham, No. 15PDJ095, 2017 WL 1046460, at *12 (Colo. Jan. 23, 2017) (stating that
Rule 1.6 “contains no exception permitting the disclosure of previously disclosed or publicly
available information.”); People v. Muhr, 370 P.3d 677, 695 (Colo. 2016) (violating Rule 1.6 by
revealing information that had previously been revealed and rejecting the argument that “selfevident” analysis in work product could not be protected against disclosure by Rule 1.6); In re
Anonymous, 932 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ind. 2010) (noting there is “no exception allowing revelation
of information relating to a representation even if a diligent researcher could unearth it through
public sources.”); Marzen, 779 N.W.2d at 766 (holding that “confidentiality is breached when an
attorney discloses information learned through the attorney-client relationship even if that
information is otherwise publicly available.”); In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 645, 656 (Kan. 2003)
(explaining that the fact that a former client’s alleged “history of making false claims” had been
publicly disclosed in court pleadings did not mean that the lawyer’s related disclosure to a store
manager and a loss prevention manager was not the disclosure of information protected by Rule
1.6); Turner v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 325, 333 (Va. 2012) (observing that there “is a
significant difference between something being a public record and it also being ‘generally known,’
that is, within the basic understanding and knowledge of the public”); McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 861–
62 (stating that lawyers’ duty of confidentiality “is not nullified by the fact that the information is
part of a public record or by the fact that someone else is privy to it”), but see State v. Mark, 231
P.3d 478, 511 (Haw. 2010) (treating a former client’s criminal conviction as “generally known”
when discussing a former client conflict); State ex rel. Youngblood v. Sanders, 575 S.E.2d 864,
872 (W. Va. 2002) (stating that information in police reports was “generally known” for Rule 1.9
purposes).
230. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.9-3, at 562.
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information. 231 Even if information concerning a former client has been broadly
publicized, the lawyer generally should not disseminate the information
further. 232 This is especially true when the former client’s information is in some
respect sensitive. 233
Second, to qualify as generally known, the former client’s information must
be (a) widely recognized by members of the public in the relevant geographic
area; or (b) widely recognized in the former client’s industry, profession, or
trade. 234 For instance, information may become widely recognized and thus
generally known because of publicity through traditional media sources, such as
newspapers, magazines, radio, or television; through publication on internet web
sites; or through social media. 235 Likewise, information should be treated as
generally known if it is announced, discussed, or identified in what reasonable
members of the industry, profession, or trade would consider a leading print or
online publication or other resource in the field. 236 On the other hand,
information that is publicly available is not necessarily generally known. 237
Finally, Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) prohibits the use of a former client’s
information only to the extent it is detrimental to the former client. 238 A lawyer
is not prohibited from using a former client’s information to gain an advantage

231. ABA Formal Op. 479, supra note 224, at 2.
232. SISK et al., supra note 1, at 404.
233. Id.
234. ABA Formal Op. 479, supra note 224, at 5; see also Mich. Eth. Op. RI-377, 2018 WL
5725274, at *4 (State Bar of Mich., Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics 2018) [hereinafter Mich.
Eth. Op. RI-377] (“Information is generally known within the meaning of [Rule] 1.9(c)(1) if it is
widely recognized by members of the public in the relevant geographic area, or it is widely
recognized in the former client’s industry, profession, or trade. Furthermore, information that is
publicly available is not necessarily generally known.”).
235. ABA Formal Op. 479, supra note 224, at 5.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Pallon v. Roggio, Nos. 04–3625(JAP), 06–1068(FLW), 2006 WL 2466854, at
*7 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2006) (“‘Generally known’ does not only mean that the information is of public
record. . . . The information must be within the basic understanding and knowledge of the public.”
(citation omitted)); In re Gordon Props., LLC, 505 B.R. 703, 707 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2013)
(“‘Generally known’ does not mean information that someone can find.”); In re Tennant, 392 P.3d
143, 148 (Mont. 2017) (explaining that for information to be considered generally known, “the
information must be within the basic knowledge and understanding of the public”; it does not
suffice that the information is part of the public record, other available sources for such information
exist, or that the lawyer otherwise received the same information from other sources); ABA Formal
Op. 479, supra note 224, at 5 (stating that information is not generally known merely because it
“has been discussed in open court, or is available in court records, in libraries, or in other public
repositories of information.”).
238. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (providing that
lawyers generally may not “use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client.”).
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for herself or a third party (such as another client) if the former client is neither
harmed nor placed at risk. 239
C. Model Rule 1.11(c): Using Confidential Government Information
Further focusing on confidentiality, Model Rule 1.11(c) provides that a
former government lawyer who has “information that the lawyer knows is
confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer
was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be
used to the material disadvantage of that person.” 240 The rule broadly defines
“confidential government information” to mean “information that has been
obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is
applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has
a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the
public.” 241
As broadly as confidential government information may be defined,
however, that universe has reasonable limits, as Franklin v. Clark 242
demonstrates. The defendants in Franklin were the current commissioner and a
former commissioner of the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD).243 They
moved to disqualify the plaintiff’s lawyer, Howard Hoffman, in part based on
Rule 1.11(c). 244 Hoffman had formerly represented the BCPD when he served
in the Baltimore City Solicitor’s Office. 245 He once wrote a memorandum
analyzing the BCPD’s general ability to terminate a police officer serving in an
exempt position, which was the issue in the case at hand. 246 The defendants
contended that the memo reflected Hoffman’s acquisition of confidential
government information because, at the time the memo was written, it was an
attorney-client privileged communication. 247 The defendants’ Rule 1.11(c)
argument failed for two reasons.
First, the defendants had produced Hoffman’s memorandum in discovery,
such that they had waived the attorney-client privilege. 248 Second, and more to
the immediate point, the court believed that the defendants were interpreting
239. See Mich. Eth. Op. RI-377, supra note 234, at *2 n.1 (stating that Rule 1.9(c)(1) permits
a lawyer to use information relating to a former client’s representation if its use does not place the
former client at a disadvantage and the information is not confidential under Rule 1.6(a)).
240. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
241. Id.
242. 454 F. Supp. 2d 356 (D. Md. 2006).
243. Id. at 358.
244. Id. at 367.
245. Id. at 363.
246. Id. at 363–64.
247. Franklin, 454 F. Supp. 2d. at 367.
248. Id. at 367–68.
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“confidential government information” too broadly. 249 The Franklin court
exposed the weakness in the defendants’ argument through an analogy:
Take, for example, an assistant U.S. attorney who prosecutes cases pursuant to
a criminal statute, and . . . writes a memorandum to his supervisor questioning
the constitutionality of that statute. Under the defendants’ reasoning, if the
lawyer left the government, he would be foreclosed from raising the
constitutionality of the statute in his representation of a private client, because
he would have access to confidential information, i.e., the memorandum. Such
a broad view of . . . confidential information pursuant to Rule 1.11(c) would
unnecessarily preclude many former government lawyers from representing
clients in the private sector, even when doing so would pose no harm to
government interests. 250

The court therefore declined to disqualify Hoffman under Rule 1.11(c). 251
As we saw earlier in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 252 Model
Rule 1.11(c) provides an independent basis to disqualify a former government
lawyer who is representing a private client in litigation. 253 Even if a former
government lawyer does not have a conflict of interest under Model Rule
1.11(a)(2), he or she may still be disqualified under Model Rule 1.11(c) if the
requirements of the latter rule are met. 254
For Model Rule 1.11(c) to apply, the former government lawyer must know
that the information in question constitutes confidential government
information; in other words, the lawyer must have actual knowledge of the
nature of the information. 255 A lawyer’s knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances. 256 A former government lawyer’s claim not to recall the
substance of confidential government information that the lawyer once
possessed will not prevent disqualification based on the lawyer’s actual
knowledge of the information. 257 The rule does not apply, however, “to
information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.” 258
249. Id. at 368.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. No. 1:17-md-2804, 2019 WL 1274555 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2019).
253. Id. at *4–5; Franklin, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
254. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription, 2019 WL 1274555, at *5 (disqualifying the lawyer).
255. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (requiring
actual knowledge for Model Rule 1.11(c) to apply); id. r. 1.0(f) (“‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or
‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.”).
256. Id. r. 1.0(f).
257. See, e.g., Kronberg v. LaRouche, No. 1:09cv947(AJT/TRJ), 2010 WL 1443934, at *3, 5
(E.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2010) (disqualifying a former government lawyer who claimed to recall very little
of the confidential government information to which he once had access).
258. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see, e.g.,
Lebamoff Enters., Inc. v. O’Connell, No. 16-cv-08607, 2020 WL 2098050, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
30, 2020) (refusing to disqualify a lawyer as an expert witness because Rule 1.11(c) did not apply
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Walker v. State 259 is an interesting case. There, Danial Vidrine spent ten
years as an Assistant Attorney General in the Road Hazard Section of the
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office, where he represented the Department of
Transportation and Development (DOTD) in civil litigation. 260 In June 1999, he
resigned and entered private law practice. 261 Around one month later, he wrote
to a number of Louisiana lawyers to inform them that he had a decade of
experience defending road hazard claims for DOTD and was “‘very informed in
the inner operations of the Department of Transportation and Development as
well as the location of valuable written documents which are essential in proving
a case against the DOTD.’” 262
In August 1999, Vidrine sued DOTD on behalf of Willie Mae Mixon. 263 In
October 1999, Vidrine began representing Robert Walker as co-counsel in a case
against DOTD that had been filed while Vidrine was still an Assistant Attorney
General. 264 DOTD successfully moved to disqualify Vidrine as plaintiffs’
counsel in both cases. 265 Different outcomes on appeal to a lower appellate court
led both Vidrine and DOTD to appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, where
the cases were consolidated. 266
On appeal, DOTD contended that Rule 1.11(c) prevented Vidrine from
using its confidential information against it in litigation. 267 As evidence that
Vidrine possessed confidential government information, DOTD pointed to
Vidrine’s July 1999 letter in which he wrote that he was intimately familiar with
DOTD’s inner workings and knew where to find “valuable written documents
which [were] essential in proving a case against the DOTD.” 268 According to
DOTD, the key documents that Vidrine mentioned were highway safety
documents that were immune from discovery and inadmissible in evidence
under 23 U.S.C. § 409. 269 DOTD’s general counsel, Larry Durant, had testified
below “that Vidrine did have, or would have had,” access to 23 U.S.C. § 409
documents while in the Attorney General’s office. 270 “Durant testified that he
to confidential government information that merely could be imputed to him because of his former
government position); Babineaux v. Foster, No. CIV.A. 04-1679, 2005 WL 711604, at *7 (E.D.
La. Mar. 21, 2005) (rejecting the city’s argument that the lawyer could be presumed to have
acquired confidential information while working for the city).
259. 817 So. 2d. 57 (La. 2002).
260. Id. at 59.
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Vidrine’s letter).
263. Id.
264. Walker, 817 So. 2d. at 59.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 62.
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Walker, 817 So. 2d. at 62.
270. Id. at 62–63.
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recalled certain instances in which Vidrine had been given ‘abnormal accident
listing information.’” 271
When deposed in the trial court, Vidrine denied having confidential
government information related to the Mixon or Walker cases. 272 On appeal, he
conceded that his July 1999 letter “was poorly worded and inartfully drafted,”
but nothing more. 273
The Walker court did not believe that Vidrine should be disqualified in the
Mixon and Walker cases. 274 Vidrine’s ill-advised July 1999 letter did not prove
that he had access to documents shielded from discovery and evidentiary use by
23 U.S.C. § 409. 275 Durant’s testimony that Vidrine “at some point had access
to 23 U.S.C. § 409 information” did not establish that Vidrine “ever had access
to confidential information regarding the Mixon or Walker matters.” 276 In
contrast, Vidrine had specifically denied under oath that he ever had such
information. 277
The Walker court was careful to explain that its refusal to disqualify Vidrine
did not mean that government agencies are powerless to disqualify their former
lawyers who reverse field on them. 278 But the agency must show that the lawyer
acquired confidential information that is relevant to a case the lawyer is currently
pursuing “and which can be used against, and to the prejudice of,” the agency. 279
Here, DOTD simply did not carry its burden of proof. 280 While Vidrine may
have once had access to confidential DOTD documents regarding unsafe
Louisiana roads, it did not necessarily follow that those materials were relevant
to the roads in the Mixon and Walker cases. 281 In the end, the court concluded
that because DOTD had not proved that Vidrine had relevant confidential
information that could be used against it, he should not be disqualified in either
the Mixon or Walker cases. 282
Although the Walker court may have reached the correct conclusion, it
appears to have applied the wrong rule in the process. The court should have
decided the case under Rule 1.11(a)(1). This is because Rule 1.11(c) applies
where a lawyer has “information that the lawyer knows is confidential
government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 63–64.
Walker, 817 So. 2d. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Walker, 817 So. 2d. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
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officer or employee.” 283 In such a case, the former government lawyer “may not
represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter
in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person.” 284 The term “person” as used in Model Rule 1.11(c)—which is
identical to Louisiana Rule 1.11(c)—”refers to third parties, not the
government.” 285 Model Rule 1.11(c) thus prevents a former government lawyer
from using confidential government information concerning a third party to
achieve an unfair advantage over that party on behalf of a private client. 286 In
other words, Model Rule 1.11(c) protects third parties that are adverse to the
client of a former government lawyer—it does not prevent the former
government lawyer from using confidential government information against her
one time government client. 287 Other rules do that. 288
Now, in fairness to the Walker court and as noted above, the outcome likely
would have been the same had the court correctly applied Rule 1.11(a)(1) and
thus Rule 1.9(c). Even if Vidrine’s prior representation of DOTD, the Mixon
case, and the Walker case constituted the same matter, nothing in the opinion
indicates that Vidrine used DOTD information to the agency’s disadvantage in
the Mixon or Walker cases in violation of Rule 1.9(c)(1). 289 Assuming that
Vidrine’s statements about his DOTD experience in his July 1999 letter to
Louisiana lawyers revealed information relating to his representation of
DOTD, 290 there is likewise nothing in the opinion to indicate that his violation
of Rule 1.9(c)(2) was sufficiently serious to justify his disqualification.
V. CONCLUSION
Government lawyers regularly leave public service for private employment.
The law firms they join or to which they return welcome them because of the
experience they gained, and the expertise they developed, while in the
government. The challenge for former government lawyers and their law firms
is recognizing and managing conflicts of interest that sometimes arise out of
lawyers’ government service. To address the special conflict of interest concerns
that emerge from the revolving door of government service, the ABA formulated
Model Rule 1.11. With a single exception, Model Rule 1.11 displaces Model
Rule 1.9, which generally governs conflicts of interest in lawyers’ successive
283. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added).
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(g), at 623.
286. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
287. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, § 1.11-3(g), at 623.
288. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (extending
Model Rule 1.9(c) to former government lawyers).
289. See id. r. 1.9(c)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
from using information relating to the representation to the former client’s disadvantage).
290. Id. r. 1.9(c)(2).
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representations. In so doing, Model Rule 1.11 attempts to balance the competing
interests in play when a matter spans a lawyer’s government service and private
practice.
Most conflict of interest controversies involving former government lawyers
pivot on the scope of the matter that is alleged to be the source of the conflict,
and whether the lawyer participated in the matter personally and substantially.
To a lesser extent, former government lawyers’ alleged acquisition of
confidential government information also spawns disqualification disputes.
Whether former government lawyers should be disciplined or disqualified for
alleged conflicts of interest tied to their public service always requires case- and
fact-specific inquiry. Avoiding discipline and disqualification, and further
avoiding imputed disqualification of the lawyer’s law firm, requires former
government lawyers and their law firms to capably navigate Model Rule 1.11.
This article provides a practical guide for doing so.
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